QUIMBY COMPOUND INTEREST

"Very well. If that is the way the winds are blowing, let no one say I don't also blow"


MAYOR 'DIAMOND' JOE QUIMBY - SIDESHOW BOB ROBERTS



ED NOTE: You don't want to know what has been going on the last few weeks as far as work is concerned. Unless you want to talk about release notes and regression testing. Just be aware that I have one of those jobs where a few thousand people rely on me in one way or another to make sure everything is working or there are serious ramifications to public health. That is all. Now back to your regularly unscheduled ramblings and ravings.



This (the other) morning as my brain crackled into place and I sat in front of the PC, I started my daily routine.

• Sugar Free Red Bull




• Granola bar




• Email




• 'The A's re-signed P Joe Kennedy to a 1 year, $2.4 million contract.'

There was really no surprise at the signing or the amount. The length of the deal was curious. But the fascination with Kennedy is something I honestly do not follow.

The Colorado Rockies signed Kennedy to a hefty contract of $2.2 Million for the 2005 season. There was no chance in hell that the A's would be able to resign him for less. Contracts for players rarely, if ever, decrease before a player reaches his mid-30's. Jermaine Dye is an example of an anomaly. But throw in Dye's injuries and declining performance as an Oakland Athletic (he was a grade B for arbitration I believe) and it's justifiable that he signed a deal for roughly 70% of what he made his last year in Oakland. There are differing averages from different studies for players that sign major league contracts before age 30 that list an increase of between 15% and 25%. The A's controlled the rights to Kennedy for 2005, so signing a one year deal was not a stretch.

The fact that the A's were able to sign Kennedy to a contract for less than an 8.5% increase is a moderate, single eyebrow raise. But, not much more than that. Maybe even a huff if you look at Kennedy's statistics.

Let's make a quick survey of the landscape before we get started. The blather about stats vs. scouts is completely ridiculous as is the idea there is such a thing as MONEYBALL teams or players. Stats are useful in context to compare players and not useful at other times. Some stats were created for the sole purpose of comparing players across generations, rather than current activity. Is Barry Bonds' current decade better than the Ted Williams decade of the 1940's? Is Williams' 1950's decade better than Babe Ruth's 1920's decade?

We really aren't going to be comparing Joe Kennedy to Lefty Grove or even Steve Carlton. We'll be comparing Kennedy to Mike Maroth and Casey Fossum.

Before we get to the stats, let's go over what exactly the A's are doing by signing Kennedy.

Well, not a whole hell of a lot. The A's traded Eric Byrnes at the tail end of his trade value and got two expensive relievers and lost a decent middle infield prospect - Omar Quintanilla. How valuable is Eric Byrnes at this point? He was non-tendered by the Baltimore Orioles, though the Pirates might overpay to pick him up. Or the Red Sox or Diamondbacks.

The A's already signed Jay Witasick to a deal far above his actually worth. The Kennedy signing just made matters stickier. Essentially, the A's traded for two pitchers they resigned for almost $4 Million for the bullpen when Ron Flores, John Rheinecker or Mario Ramos could have filled Kennedy's role and Evan Fahrner, Connor Robertson, Shane Komine or even Shawn Kohn could have filled Witasick's role. Combined, those six pitchers would cost half as much as Kennedy and Witasick. And in the case of Flores, Rheinecker, Robertson, Komine and Fahrner - more effective individually.

It boggles the mind. While others are not surprised by the monetary cost the A's are dolling out, because it is within the parameters of the current market, they are missing what part of the market the A's are getting these players from. The lower tier, the bottom third. League average at best in a very 'average' league.

Joe Kennedy is young, well, younger, so for some odd reason slack is cut for him. The question remains - If he is being paid $2.4 Million dollars as a pitcher, why doesn't he pitch as much as he is WORTH? Kennedy is an expensive version of John Rheinecker. He's been in Tampa Bay and Colorado in a terrible situation stuck in the wang of the United States to the ultimate evil heights for a pitcher in the state that likes to pretend it's not a state on the verge of Nazism. Still, he's pitched poorly. Very poorly. He had one good season, which many can point to as a fluke, an aberration, luck.

SEASON	TEAM	G	GS	CG	SHO	IP	H	R	ER	HR	BB	SO	W	L	SV	HLD	BLSV	ERA
2001	TB	20	20	0	0	118.2	122	63	58	16	34	78	7	8	0	0	--	4.44
2002	TB	30	30	5	1	197.2	204	114	99	23	55	109	8	11	0	0	--	4.53
2003	TB	32	22	1	1	134.2	167	101	91	19	47	77	3	12	1	1	1	6.13
2004	Col	27	27	1	0	162.1	163	68	66	17	67	117	9	7	0	0	--	3.66
2005	Col	16	16	0	0	92.0	128	81	72	12	44	52	4	8	0	0	--	7.04
2005	Oak	19	8	0	0	61.2	64	33	30	8	20	45	4	5	0	0	2	4.45
2005	--	35	24	0	0	153.2	192	114	102	20	64	97	8	13	0	0	2	6.01
Total	--	144	123	7	2	763.0	848	460	416	95	267	478	35	51	1	1	3	4.91

SEASON	TEAM	W%	#PIT	TBF	#P/PA	#P/IP	#P/GS	K/9	K/BB	AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS
2001	TB	.467	1894	498	3.80	16.0	94.7	5.97	2.29	.269	.321	.452	.771
2002	TB	.421	3108	840	3.70	15.8	103.6	4.99	1.98	.269	.328	.427	.755
2003	TB	.200	2254	619	3.64	16.8	92.2	5.19	1.64	.303	.364	.491	.854
2004	Col	.563	2509	705	3.56	15.4	92.9	6.49	1.75	.265	.342	.423	.760
2005	Col	.333	1585	442	3.59	17.2	99.1	5.09	1.18	.334	.406	.504	.907
2005	Oak	.444	993	262	3.79	16.2	85.6	6.68	2.25	.267	.324	.433	.758
2005	--	.381	2578	704	3.66	16.8	94.6	5.72	1.52	.308	.376	.477	.850
Total	--	.407	12343	3366	3.67	16.2	96.0	5.64	1.79	.282	.346	.452	.797

SEASON	TEAM	2B	3B	RBI	SH	SF	IBB	HB	WP	BK	SB	CS	IR	IS	GDP	GB	FB	G/F
2001	TB	29	3	59	2	5	0	3	5	1	7	6	0	0	9	149	153	0.97
2002	TB	47	2	103	2	9	0	16	4	0	12	9	0	0	22	247	285	0.87
2003	TB	35	6	97	1	8	1	11	3	1	10	4	13	7	12	206	189	1.09
2004	Col	40	3	63	9	6	12	8	5	0	14	5	0	0	15	245	162	1.51
2005	Col	25	2	68	4	5	4	6	7	1	3	1	0	0	11	155	97	1.60
2005	Oak	16	0	35	0	1	2	1	1	0	3	0	13	8	5	81	74	1.09
2005	--	41	2	103	4	6	6	7	8	1	6	1	13	8	16	236	171	1.38
Total	--	192	16	425	18	34	19	45	25	3	49	25	26	15	74	1083	960	1.13

In Kennedy's case it was more of a collection of coincidences. Kennedy went down with 'tired arm' in August of 2003. He was on pace to pitch 235 innings for Colorado. In 2004 it was noticeable he lost some of the zip on his average fastball and relied more on his change-up. Loh and behold he was a better pitcher by changing speeds more often. Particularly advantageous in the confines of Coors Field. Kennedy also lost a month to shoulder inflammation. 2005 rolls around, Kennedy gets his 'fastball' back and he falls off the table he set for himself.

Kennedy throws across his body with a lower than 3/4 delivery. He is not injury-prone. He is injured and will continue to be so unless he can go further toward the ground ala Chad Bradford or learn how to pitch with balance. His fastball is a two-seam fastball and average at best. Because of his motion he can get it inside to left-handers. But right-handers exploit the fastball. His slider is a 'hey, look what I can do' pitch that he throws less than 5% of the time. His 12-6 curveball is not Zito like or even Mulder like and he has the same problem with it as Zito - when it works, great...those in the bleachers should watch out when it doesn't. His change-up is his best pitch with a good tail at the end. But, it is also helped by his ill-advised throwing motion and he does not have a lot of confidence in it.

In short, Kennedy is one of those guys on the pitcher's mound who is more thrower than pitcher. There is an art and a deliberate act of pitching. Kennedy has not figured it out and for some reason the A's think Curt Young can piece him together, or maybe Rick Peterson can if they A's trade him to the Mets.

Soon, Baseball Prospectus will deliver Nate Silver's PECTOA numbers for 2006. If you haven't seen the wonders of the crystal spreadsheet, you are not working hard enough at being a fan of ingenuity. Many people on the 'fringe' of baseball's inner sanctum have their own calculations or rough estimates for hitter and pitcher projections (one never uses the word predictions in baseball if they can get around it with 'projections'). There are several annuals that produce these numbers, but Silver has been the most accurate to date. Taking some liberty with my member account at Baseball Prospectus, here's what Kennedy has done and what he projects for the next several years.

Year VORP 2005 14.3 2006 11.0 2007 10.4 2008 10.1 2009 8.3

Year 75% 50% 25% Weighted Mean 2005 4.10 4.82 5.41 4.77 2006 4.00 4.79 5.67 4.67 2007 3.71 4.48 5.71 4.53 2008 3.87 4.29 5.19 4.44 2009 3.95 4.45 5.29 4.44

Year Attrition Rate Drop Rate Breakout 2005 9.3% 0.0% 11.4% 2006 26.0% 6.4% 10.7% 2007 36.6% 10.7% 12.3% 2008 39.3% 19.6% 6.8% 2009 50.9% 25.1% 8.3%

You can look at the numbers and figure it out without making too much of what it all means. Pretty pictures and graphs make it real easy. But, it looks like the A's just paid for another Terrence Long, Jermaine Dye or better - another Ricardo Rincon. At least it's only for one year. Maybe less if the A's can find a buyer for Kennedy.

Rincon, by the way, was one of the top five luckiest relievers in baseball in 2005. Hard to imagine since according to the chorus of boos that welcomed his plod to the mound and cherished his exits at the Trojan Horse/Worm Oakland Coliseum.

PLAYER	TEAM	BRP
Trevor Miller	TBA	15.4
Ricardo Rincon	OAK	14.6
Neal Cotts	CHA	14.2
J.C. Romero	MIN	13.6
Scott Schoeneweis	TOR	12.7

Back to Kennedy.

Kennedy looks like a protracted sign and trade deal. Even as teams talked about the availability of Barry Zito in the past weeks, Beane had a much cheaper left-handed starter to throw into the mix to salvage any possible deal.

Cheaper, maybe.

Better, no.

And definitely not worth the money. But, teams like Los Angeles, Seattle, Texas, the NY Mets, the Yankees, the Cubs, the Orioles, the Blue Jays, the Astros...can afford the throw money around on league average pitchers.

EXAMPLE: The Cubs, Orioles and A's have been rumored to be holding talks involving Miguel Tejada to the Cubs, Mark Prior to the A's and Barry Zito to the Orioles, prospects and cash also in the mix. Now, if the central part of the deal starts to erode as talks progress, Beane can pull Kennedy out of his pocket and try to salvage something of the time spent on the talks and perhaps a lesser deal transpires between the three teams or as a straight up swap between two of the clubs.

The hard part is selling a team on Kennedy.

Why am I harping on this? Because there ARE better, much cheaper guys out there. This is an ongoing issue with the A's organization. They have gotten lazy and are overspending on mediocrity. No, not league average, mediocre.

MIKE MAROTH: 2005 Salary $405,000

SEASON	TEAM	G	GS	CG	SHO	IP	H	R	ER	HR	BB	SO	W	L	ERA
2002	Det	21	21	0	0	129.2	136	68	64	7	36	58	6	10	4.48
2003	Det	33	33	1	0	193.1	231	131	123	34	50	87	9	21	5.73
2004	Det	33	33	2	1	217.0	244	112	104	25	59	108	11	13	4.31
2005	Det	34	34	0	0	209.0	235	123	110	30	51	115	14	14	4.74
Total	--	121	121	3	1	748.0	846	434	401	96	196	368	40	58	4.83

CASEY FOSSUM: 2005 Salary $950,000

SEASON	TEAM	G	GS	CG	SHO	IP	H	R	ER	HR	BB	SO	W	L	SV	HLD	BLSV	ERA
2001	Bos	13	7	0	0	44.1	44	26	24	4	20	26	3	2	0	0	--	4.87
2002	Bos	43	12	0	0	107.2	113	56	41	12	30	101	5	4	1	3	0	3.46
2003	Bos	19	14	0	0	79.0	82	55	48	9	34	63	6	5	1	0	0	5.47
2004	Ari	27	27	0	0	142.0	171	111	105	31	63	117	4	15	0	0	--	6.66
2005	TB	36	25	0	0	163.2	170	100	89	21	60	128	8	12	0	0	1	4.92
Total	--	138	85	0	0	535.2	580	348	307	77	207	435	26	38	2	3	1	5.17

WHy he A's traded for Kennedy is still up for discussion. The real reason the A's signed Kennedy is they held his rights and they have very little to nothing in the minor league system ready to emerge as a starting pitcher in the next 18 months.

Now, that's what the A's think. For the most part, that is very true, however, the A's have a very bad habit of overlooking minor league players in their own organization in favor of cherry-picking players from other organizations.

With success - Mark Ellis, Terrence Long (2000 - 2001), Chad Bradford, Frank Menechino, Olmedo Saenz, Marco Scutaro, Cory Lidle, Justin Duchsherer, Aaron Harang.

Without much success - Terrence Long, (2002 - 2003), Carlos Pena, Erik Hiljus, Charles Thomas, Mark Johnson.

Kennedy is the A's insurance policy for spot-starter and left-handed relief. Of course, the A's have more insurance policies in their organization than Mutual of Omaha's Wild Kingdom. Insurance policies are often much like gambling and only useful if there is a relative need for them. Buying multiple insuance policies doesn't make sense.

The A's have a very, very small front office. They have just enough personnel to get the job done. Other organizations have executives, vice-presidents of batting practice balls, chief executive officer of the ball boys. Other organizations have a large swath of people to make connections with players in the off-season. Make phone calls just as they settle in after a long season. Call the rookies and the players completing their first full year in professional baseball and encourage them on their success and relieve the burden of their apparent failures. Touch base with some of the players approaching their sixth year in the organization and some potentially available in the Rule 5 draft. During the Holidays, phone calls and cards hoping for the best in the coming year, etc.

The A's sometimes don't have the time or resources to connect with their players at all. Some might turn up in Winter Ball without the A's knowing until they receive a fax from their Latin team. It's discouraging to be in a situation where you feel you are neglected and unwanted, yet there are 10-15 other teams that would gladly pluck you for their 25 Man roster - or at least give you an honest assessment of your skills and abilities and what the organization expects from you.

The flip side is that other organizations employ several people to blow various amounts of smoke up a player's ass, often the same smoke. While the A's have very, very few. Count on one hand, most likely the number of people the A's have contact players in the off-season if they are not on the 25 Man Roster. It's one thing to have a dozen people tell 12 players the same thing, "we are really hoping you make an impact in Spring Training and can make the 25/40 Man Roster. But if you don't, we want to keep you as close as possible as our first option, our insurance policy, if someone who plays your position gets hurt or traded. Now, work hard in the weight room and work on these things in Winter Ball..."

It's another for a single A's executive to make calls to 12 different middle infielders and essentially tell them, "you're our insurance policy, and we control your rights, so stick it out and maybe something will happen. If not, we don't care, you can leave after your sixth year in the minors. Happy Holidays."

Or worse, "I know you are frustrated, we are, too. We really need your bat/arm and just don't have any room. It's too expensive to just cut a major league player, and we are a small-budget team. Why, we may not even have enough money to pay the grounds crew. All the parking attendants are cold and hungry and out of work. Even Tiny Tim is losing hope...But, you're our insurance policy. If something should happen, you'll get the first phone call. If we can still afford to pay the phone bills. And our cable package, we only get 8 HBO channels."